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Low carbon governance in multi-level structures: The role of the EU in the Climate Relations with India

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Introduction

Because global climate negotiations are stalled currently, the European Union (EU) as a major climate policy player, is looking for alternate avenues to enforce climate relations with other regions and countries of the world. In this context, the strategic partnership agreements with rapidly-developing economies in Asia are of importance (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011). . In this special kind of bilateral relationships the EU uses various approaches to exert influence and enhance climate political collaboration. For example, presenting models, pursuing best practice examples and stimulating the creation of networks and green markets. Despite its low per capita emission, India is the world’s fourth largest economy and third largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter (PBL, 2011, 13). Hence, it belongs to the relevant addressees for EU’s efforts to promote global climate change policies.

The paper looks at the potentials for mutual beneficial cooperation and how the EU endeavoured to integrate climate relations into the strategic partnership. As for the empirical description and analysis, we will explore climate change and consider cross-cutting policy issues from related policy fields, they being renewable energy, energy efficiency and environment. The EU’s capacity to act and exert power varies across policy areas (Hill and Smith 2011), with climate and environmental policy belonging to the policy areas in which the EU performed very well.

Moreover, the multilateral context of the international climate negotiations will be discussed. The paper also sheds light on the European multi-level governance structure of the bilateral cooperation with India in which the competencies between the supranational actor EU and the member states partly overlap. It distinguishes between the role of the supranational EU actors and action taken by the individual member states. The paper attempts to explain whether, and if so, how, the EU was able to shift various climate political issues onto the agenda of the strategic cooperation with India as it wished.

It is not possible to isolate the various influences on the strategic partnership clearly. Based on a literature review and interviews performed in 2013, however, the paper describes how the academic debate and stakeholders in India and the EU assess the effectiveness and capabilities of EU actors. Are there any indications that the various leadership roles which EU institutional actors, member states and societal actors

have exhibited in internal and external climate policy (Wurzel 2011) can stimulate rapprochement between the EU and India?

External and internal climate policy in the EU multi-level governance system

Before scrutinizing the bilateral climate relations between the EU and India, we will briefly elaborate on the multi-level governance structure in order to substantiate the analysis of the case. In the current academic debate, the EU multi-level governance structures are discussed both as blessings and curse at the same time, providing diverse venues for political entrepreneurs as well as veto players.

The multi-level governance research debate originated from theorising about the processes of European integration (Hooghe, Marks 2001), decentralisation processes in a large number of countries worldwide (Hooghe, Marks, Schakel 2010) and the emergence of transnational regimes and policy networks operating at different governance levels (Hooghe, Marks 2010). In respective governance processes, formal central state authority is complemented and/or sometimes replaced through other forms of governance involving higher and lower policy-making levels as well as public and private actors. The analytical focus of multi-level governance research is, in simplified terms, on processes of collective action and the production of public goods in which both public and private actors can be party (Zürn et al. 2010). In particular, the private actor involvement distinguishes it from public-policy analysis, which highlights the importance of governmental agents and refers to "anything a government chooses to do or not to do" (Dye 1972, 2 quoted from Howlett, Ramesh 2003,5). Moreover, the interconnected decision areas of the various policy-making levels involved are subject to analysis that goes beyond solely dealing with intergovernmental relations.

Multi-level governance structures seem to be evolving, in particular with respect to cross-border problems such as environmental degradation and climate change. Their effectiveness and possible benefits are discussed not only in respect to the internalisation of externalities but also in respect to their innovation capacities (Wälti 2010). These structures are intended to facilitate policy experimentation and diffusion of best practice, and, as the EU multi-level reinforcement debate shows, offer multiple access points for leadership.

The European multi-level governance structure has been beneficial in forming ambitious environmental and climate policies (Fairbrass, Jordan 2004; Schreurs, Tiberghien 2007, 2010; Zito 2000). This could be shown across various cases of European internal policy-making and is demonstrated by the role of the EU in international politics. It would be misleading though to generalize this insight: The EU's complex governance structure has also proven to complicate European integration and delay political decision-making in various policy areas (Weale 1996, 2000, Scharpf 1999, Wurzel 2011 8, Jordan et al. 2013). Whether or not the European multi-level governance structure is supportive in forming ambitious policies is related to various conditions and contexts (Zito 2000). Strikingly a number of policy studies have shown that environment and climate protection seem to be policy fields in which – not necessarily but quite often - "decisional stalemate can be overcome"

(Wurzel,: 8). In addition in both policy fields the EU policy output was time and again astonishingly demanding and extensive.

The strategic partnership between the EU and India exists within multi-level governance structures. In the fields of internal and external environmental policy, the competencies of the EU and the MS overlap, because environment and climate policies are shared competencies in the EU. This leaves room for member state action (Delreux, 2013). Both the Union and the member states may legislate and adopt legally binding acts - the European regulation taking precedence. Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) climate change is specifically mentioned in Article 174 of the EU treaties giving the EU the power to promote measures at the international level “to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). Energy policy – vital for the mainstreaming of climate mitigation goals - belongs to the shared competencies between the EU and the member states since the Lisbon Treaty as well (2009). With this, the EU received the formal powers to develop European energy policy. Still, the member states retain the right to veto with respect to their specific energy mix; EU “measures shall not affect a member state's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). Respective policies require unanimous voting in the Council and consultation of the European Parliament, Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

Climate policy and decision-making in India

As in the case of the EU, the competences between the centre and the states in India in climate policy issues do overlap as well. Environmental policy and the main responsibility for climate policy and international agreements in this field lies with the central government (Gupta, 2001; Jasanoff, 1993; Reich and Bowonder, 1992). According to the constitution, the national government has exclusive powers in a number of issue areas relevant for climate policy, such as foreign trade, atomic power, mineral and oil resources and control of industries. Energy, a highly important policy field for the mainstreaming of climate mitigation goals and the transition to a sustainable energy supply, falls, however, under concurrent legislation shared between the central government and the states.

Similarly to the EU, the implementation of environmental and climate policy relies on the individual Indian states. The economic and political importance of the India's subnational states is growing. Apart from the implementation of national policies, the Indian states can - and partially do - promote their own priorities with independent initiatives as well (Jørgensen 2012) and therefore should be considered significant climate policy players (Atteridge 2012). The state list of the Indian constitution includes a variety of areas that are relevant for climate policy for instance water, land use and agriculture. Although constraint by financial bottlenecks and dependent on financial transfers from the national level, India's states have their own limited room for maneuverability in environmental issues (Jørgensen 2012). This offers additional venues for bilateral cooperation between the EU and India.

The emergence of the strategic partnership between the EU and India

Since 2003, the EU has developed strategic partnerships with each of the BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -, adding to the previously established partnerships with the USA, Japan and Canada. Strategic partnerships are used as a means to secure EU influence on the development of global governance structures in times of power shifts in the international system. The newly rising pivotal economic, global and regional powers in Asia, Africa and South America are regarded as relevant players in the future development of multilateral relations and as important trading partners. The partnerships with the BRICS countries have developed on a case-by-case basis - driven by supranational actors including actors from within the Commission and individual EU member states but not always by a unified EU interest. If member states wished to intensify and consolidate their existing national partnerships with the rising powers, they supported the Europeanization of the relations and used the EU level as a means to multiply influence (Hess 2012). Otherwise, they opposed Europeanization, guarding their national relations with the respective country. All partnerships consist of comparable institutional frameworks that follow "largely the same patterns" (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011, 386). The relationships consist of a primary cooperation agreement, various separate agreements establishing ministerial and expert fora for cooperation and strategic political agreements, the latter of which target specific collaborative areas of joint interest.

The relations between India and the EU date back to the early 1960s when India was among the first countries to recognize the European Economic Community (EEC). But it was only in the 1990s that India received greater attention by the EU especially after her economic liberalisation in 1991, the primary bilateral cooperation agreement between the EU and India originates from 1994. Economic ties have been expanded and deepened and have transformed the EU into India's largest trading partner. The value of the trade grew from €28.6 billion in 2003 to €72.7 billion in 2013. In 2013 India ranked 8th as the EU's trade partner; EU investment stock in India was growing (EU Commission 2014). The increasing importance of India as a trade partner for the EU was one of the central motives for the strategic partnership - the other being the fact that both India and the EU strive to increase their global importance (Groening 2012, Münchow-Pohl 2012). The EU perceived India as a rising regional and global power and thereby strove to make India "a responsible and reliable partner on the global scene" (Hess 2014, 305).

Rising trade and investment paved the way for the first summit in Lisbon in 2000. Today, India belongs to the small group of nations that include among others the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and Canada with whom the EU holds regular summit meetings. Particular progress in institutionalizing the collaboration was made at the Hague Summit in November 2004, culminating in the approval of a plan mapping out the so-called 'strategic partnership' in the course of the Delhi summit under the British EU-presidency (Jain 2006; Bava 2008; Wagner 2009; Wuelbers 2010; Muenchow-Pohl 2012).

In September 2005, the EU and India adopted an ambitious and wide-ranging Joint Action Plan (JAP) that sets the course for the future EU-India strategic partnership. Both sides identified five key areas of cooperation and agreed on a variety of exchanges, consultative mechanisms, and dialogues (Council of the European Union 2005) including:

1. Strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms
2. Deepening political dialogue and cooperation
3. Bringing together people and cultures
4. Enhancing economic policy dialogue and cooperation
5. Developing trade and investment

Nearly a decade later, the academic debate shows that the overall assessment of the returns of the strategic partnership is sobering for the most part. Indeed, Keukeleire and Bruyninckx have described all of the EU strategic partnerships with the Brazil, Russia, India and China “as a rhetorical façade” (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011, 389). As compared to the BRICs countries Russia and China, the EU relations with India were deemed “less developed and less essential for the EU” (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx, 2011, 388). From the Indian side, the partnership was assessed less relevant than the collaboration with the USA (Hess 2014). The EU and India have not been successful in “committing to a clear-cut common agenda with specific goals” (Muenchow-Pohl, 2013: 13).

The achievements in “hard” policies, such as security, were disappointing. Political and security issues have hardly seen progress compared to the relevance and expectations of both sides to increase their global importance (Muenchow-Pohl 2012, Groening 2012, Wülbers 2011 u.a.). India and the EU still have different preferences and priorities that can hardly be bridged because of the different capacities that both sides have at their disposal (Bendiek, Wagner 2008; Muenchow-Pohl, 2013). Despite many shared security concerns hardly any progress could be achieved in this field (Muenchow-Pohl 2012, Groening 2012, Wuelbers 2011).

Economic ties have been expanded and strengthened, thus transforming the EU into India’s largest trading partner. However, the political ties do not correspond to the level of economic cooperation. Despite the often emphasized necessity for a free trade agreement, both sides find it difficult to agree on a Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) which is under negotiations since 2007 (Khandekar G, Sengupta J 2012, Muenchow-Pohl 2012, Groening 2012).

Progress has been made in a number of single policy issue areas, particularly in technology transfer, science collaboration and environment. An important tool provided by the EU was the 7th EU Framework Programme for science and technological development, under which India became the EU’s fourth largest international partner. The number of technology transfer projects involving European technology and financial support outstripped respective US-Indian collaborations (Basile & Régnier 2012, Groening 2012). Yet the EU lags behind in promoting “brain

circulation”, i.e. student exchange; the number of Indian students attending European universities (except for the UK) cannot compare to the number attending US and Canadian universities (Basile & Régnier 2012, Groening 2012, interviews).

Some authors point to a lacking of mutual understanding amongst the strategic partners, including their institutional environments, economic and international relevance (Groening 2012, Basile & Régnier 2012, Hess 2012, 14). From India’s perspective the supranational EU structures challenge the partners, for them it is difficult to identify the contact partners and responsible actors (Hess, 2012, 4). A lacking convergence was cited in the way “socio-economic phenomena and processes” were perceived by Indian and European actors (Basile & Régnier 2012). EU actors were not able to improve the mutual understanding and overcome diverging interests (Basile & Régnier 2012). In reference to projects such as ITER, Galileo, civil aviation and science and technology cooperation EU methods of taking action were assessed rather incremental (Wülbers 2011, 149).

Low carbon governance in India and the EU – Potentials for Cooperation

Since 2000, the EU has increasingly endeavoured to transfer its championship in supra- and international climate protection into the bilateral cooperation with India (Murrell 2012). A significant potential for mutual beneficial cooperation on low carbon development and respective policy learning and transfer does exist. Energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy have a very high potential for bilateral Indian European cooperation (Upadhyaya 2012). The EU has ambitious regulatory frameworks for green energy options in place, and a number of member states experiment with innovative approaches to improving low carbon governance (Jordan et al. 2010, Jaenicke 2012). Likewise, India wishes to boost and innovate its clean energy and energy efficiency policies. With respect to India, the economic growth pattern and increased emissions suggest greater “need and capacity for mitigation” on the one hand; on the other hand, binding commitments are constrained by its “continuing burden of income and energy poverty” (Raghunandan 2012:1). Because of its national imperatives and constellations, India pursues an ambivalent strategy in the field of international climate policy. Belonging to the group of the world’s most vulnerable countries with regard to climate change (Yohe et al., 2006, Malone and Brenkert, 2008), India has an interest in the success of negotiations on climate change and sustainable development, the results of which may provide technology transfer and financial support. However, as in many other fields, India is not willing to enter into any kind of legally binding commitment.

India’s fast-emerging economy and the EU’s pioneering environmental economy, offer different but at the same time mutually complementary perspectives in the energy sector. India’s emerging market economy, belongs to the group of countries with a policy-driven increase in the diffusion of photovoltaic (Jaenicke, 2012) and windpower. This is comparable to the European approach to a policy-induced market formation for climate-friendly technical innovations. India is facing chronic energy deficits and has a high dependence from oil and gas imports. At present India needs to import more than 70 percent of its oil and gas mainly from the Middle East. In order to increase her energy security India is looking at different national and foreign policy

strategies to diversify its energy resources (Dasgupta 2008). One part is the promotion of renewable energies and energy conservation measures in order to reduce its dependency. The transition of India's energy sector has been pursued for nearly five decades (Anumakonda, 2007, 540, cf. IPCC 2011) with a variety of programs, administrative agencies and regulatory frameworks, including ones that have promoted renewable energies and increased energy conservation (Pew, 2008). Innovative institutions were established like the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) in 1987, the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources in 1992 which became the present Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) in 2006, and the Bureau of Energy Efficiency in 2002.

India's green energy policies can potentially contribute to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and develop low carbon strategies through the backdoor. The national climate policy framework includes a range of sector-based mitigation policies (Sant and Gambhir 2012) and builds on the above mentioned long established institutions

The EU goals are level the playing field for EU firms, create new markets and transfer the green growth approach to other countries (Vogler/ Belis et al. 2013).

Economic opportunities drive renewable energy policies in the EU as well as in India, which, in turn, contributes to climate mitigation (IPCC 2011, 879). Renewable energy policies are the ones with the greatest socio-economic potential. In India, for instance, they can be combined with the development of infrastructure in rural areas and employment. Of particular importance therein is the growing market for renewable energy producers (IPCC 2011) - an important driving force behind mitigation policies. India's National Action Plan on Climate Change specifically deals with the deployment of appropriate technology as well as new and innovative forms of governance framing climate policy as industrial policy. These include market, regulatory and voluntary mechanisms and efficient as well as cost effective strategies (GOI 2008). Because of its energy needs, India is interested in cooperation with focus on research, technology transfer, norms, regulation and trade related to the challenges mentioned above.

India's domestic climate and energy policy is not at all averse to international lesson drawing, for the instrument mix is influenced by experiences from other countries (Atterdidge 2012)

The climate relations between the EU and India from 2000-2012

The cooperation between the EU and India in the areas of environment, climate and particularly energy belongs to the more prosperous elements of the bilateral partnership. The congruence of interests has led to various initiatives and programs that have increased energy cooperation, for instance the creation of a EU-India Energy Panel and the EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change (Murrell 2012, Wagner 2012). Since 2005 environment, climate and energy issues have become increasingly important throughout the EU-Indian high-level summits (Groening 2012), energy policy became the priority area in 2012. EU-India dialogues on environment and energy have been unfolding (Murrell 2012 Wagner 2012). India and the EU agreed on a closer bilateral environmental cooperation, committing

themselves to compliance with international environmental agreements and to the importance of the on-going climate negotiations in 2007. Climate change received greater attention during the EU-India summit that was held in Marseille in 2008. New issues and activities were added to the Joint Action Plan, for instance the promotion of sustainable development within the context of “unprecedented pressure on energy and natural resources” (EU-India Summit 2008). Moreover, a Joint Work Program on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change and a European Business & Technology Centre (focusing on private sector cooperation in clean technologies) were introduced. Climate change was made a priority during the 10th summit of the EU and India held in New Delhi in 2009 (Groening 2012, 127). The EU and India agreed to concentrate the early implementation of a Joint Program in the fields of “solar energy, development of clean coal technology and increase in energy efficiency” (European Union 2012: 15).

The EU funded more than “100 projects worth approximately 340 million Euros related to environmental protection and sustainable development in India since 2000, and 45% of these committed funds were allocated to climate change adaptation and mitigation” (European Union 2009: 11). India received support through the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) which was initiated by the EU in November 2008. GEEREF is a public private partnership aimed at transferring clean and renewable energy technologies to developing countries (Murell 2012). At the 12th summit in Delhi in 2012 the “joint declaration for enhanced cooperation on energy” formulated concrete objectives. Key areas of cooperation were energy efficiency of products, energy efficiency in the building sector, the development of smart power grids research, and innovation cooperation on renewable energy technologies.

Energy efficiency and renewable energy policy are fundamental elements of climate mitigation strategies. As described above, they are in fact relevant topics of the strategic cooperation between India and the EU. In the official political framing of the collaboration, however, climate mitigation was virtually neglected for the most part. The partnership reflects India’s provisos. Energy and environment were easier to integrate into the partnership. According to EU experts, it was – and is - difficult to make climate policy explicitly subject to the bilateral cooperation as long as political backing remains absent from India’s dominant domestic discourse (interviews performed in March 2013).

Accordingly, the expanding bilateral energy and environment cooperation between the EU and India has not yet fostered a more conducive cooperation in international forums of climate change governance (Michaelowa and Michelowa 2012). India’s negotiation strategy became more flexible temporarily, however has not changed yet in respect to the core preferences (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012, Wagner 2012). Contrary to the objectives of the Joint Action Plan - as well as the agreements from the summits - the EU and India were not able to coordinate their positions during the international climate negotiations. This discordance became obvious during the climate negotiations at the Copenhagen summit in 2009, where the external EU climate policy failed (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011, Wurzel, Connelly 2011). Neither the EU supranational actors, nor the representatives of the climate ambitious member states, were able to provide directional leadership. India did not

agree on three important items (Fujara, Egenhofer 2010, Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012, Wagner 2012): a commitment to binding greenhouse gas reduction, a peaking year for India, and the introduction of financial mechanisms (Fujara, Egenhofer 2010). In the multilateral context, multi-level reinforcement bringing India's and the EU positions closer together did occur - if at all - only temporarily. The setting of ambitious GHG reduction targets both by the EU and a number of member states during the run-up to the climate negotiations did not enhance the convergence of the negotiating positions. The EU was unable to change India's position which became manifest when India refused any commitment for binding emission targets in Durban. The Copenhagen climate summit highlighted a shift in the multilateral constellation - indeed, the EU's "relative power" loss to the BRIC countries China, India and Brazil, who spoke with one voice and showed capacity for coalition building parallel to the official negotiations (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011, 390).

But the divergence between India and the EU in the climate negotiations is not written in stone and may not necessarily last forever. India's domestic climate discourse is shifting (Dubash 2013, Thaker, Leiserowitz 2014). It is stimulated by a rising awareness of a) India's vulnerability, b) the problem of energy security and c) economic assets - co-benefits - arising from climate policy for the private sector, such as clean development mechanisms and markets for renewable energy technologies (Dubash 2013, Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). Already during the last few years, India's climate negotiation position was not entirely stable and consistent, reflecting the conflicting views of actors from different parts of the government such as the diplomats and representatives from the Ministry of Environment and Forests (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). Individual rapprochement was shown by the former Indian Minister for Environment and Forestry, who advocated for legally binding GHG reduction commitments at the 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancún, thus modifying India's negotiation strategy temporarily at least (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012).

Climate relations between the EU and India emerge, on the one hand, from within the context of India's equity postulate, which rules out any obligatory emission reductions for developing countries, and, on the other hand, from the co-benefit approach. The co-benefit approach points to emission reductions that are accompanied by positive side effects such as for instance poverty eradication and employment (Dubash et al. 2013). It has been incorporated into India's first National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008, which offers connecting factors to the European green energy and climate policy. It includes "national missions" for the promotion of solar energy ("Solar Mission"), energy efficiency ("Enhanced Energy Efficiency") and a vision of a "green India" (Chengappa 2008, GOI 2008). Furthermore, the title of the 12th five-year plan, "Fast, Sustainable and More Inclusive Growth", and the included study "Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth" suggest that - comparable to the EU - low carbon development does reach the political agenda (Government of India, Planning Commission 2011). India's emerging climate policy reflects an increasing awareness about the linkages and the impact of climate and ecology on the economic development (Gorawantschy, Querner & Mahajan 2011).

The processes of bilateral relations between the EU and India are, from the European side, driven both by the EU and the member states. The supranational level of the EU was involved in the production of the programmatic and institutional output and has played an important role as a financial supporter of the EU-India strategic partnership since 2008. The overall EU funding for India between 2007 and 2013 amounted € 470 million, moving from development assistance to new areas of mutual interest and cooperation (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011: 388). Climate policy is discussed primarily via the EU channels and with the member states. For example, the European Emission Trading System, which provided the basis for the extensive implementation of Clean Development Mechanisms, was easier to relate to the EU.

Some authors suggest that, in areas where the EU enjoys exclusive competencies, such as trade, its capacity to act as well as its ability to develop a unified position, are considered favourably in comparison to its policy areas that are still handled by an intergovernmental approach (Muenchow-Pohl 2012, Groening 2012).

From the perspective of the member states, the EU strategic partnership with India accompanies and stabilises their own bilateral relationships. With the exception of the controversial issues, the partnership promotes, moreover, the “general European interest vis-à-vis” the country (Keukeleire, Bruyninckx 2011, 391). Their action occurs parallel to the EU: large member states like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have pursued their own bilateral, even strategic partnerships with India at times. In May 2000, Germany and India adopted the ‘Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership in the 21st Century’, involving yearly meetings of the heads of government. Since 2006, the focus of the strategic cooperation is on energy, science and technology, and defence. In this context Germany strives to promote climate policy and to awaken consciousness. The collaboration has the potential to develop into an economic cooperation.

In regard to the energy sector, a few of the larger EU member states who are engaged in India appear to be more active and capable in independent implementation of projects and initiatives (Interviews, March 2013) than the EU. As for the member states, France is cooperating with India in the field of nuclear energy; Germany and Spain in clean energy. The Indo-German Energy Programme addresses energy efficiency and, since 2010, the promotion of renewable energy. The programme is implemented jointly by a large number of governmental agencies and funding institutions and supports, amongst others, the implementation of India’s Energy Conservation Act, addressing energy-intensive industries, manufacturers of household appliances and industrial equipment, residential households, consulting firms and power stations. It appears easier for the member state Germany to formulate and define goals and it can build on administrative capacities and projects, combining political exchange with pilot projects. In the areas of climate and energy policy, the potential for the German development cooperation to exert influence is particularly large.

From the Indian perspective, the EU is regarded as the valid partner for bi- and multi-lateral agreements in trade, economic and environmental issues. In contrast the member states have greater economic and technological capacities for practical cooperation and the implementation of measures. Moreover, the EU member states

benefit from a traditional intergovernmental approach, one that is easier to navigate for the Indian counterparts, as opposed to the EU's institutional architecture with its complex decision-making structures (Jain 2006, Interviews 2013). "The member states having similar institutions with easier decision-making and less complex procedures win over European Union's complicated multi-level governance structure which is always in the process of evolution and one is not sure about who to approach for a given issue." (Wülbers 2011, 148). In India, moreover, bilateral cooperation with the EU often received less attention in contrast to individual member states that are more visible in the Indian media (Muenchow-Pohl 2012; Jain/Pandey 2010).

Multi-level governance involving the member states and the EU nurtures and reinforces the cooperation in part. One example of the favourable influence of the European multi-level governance structure on the successful transfer of ambitious standards and norms is the regulation of electronic waste in India. Originally commissioned by the EU, an environmental project was implemented by the German development cooperation. In a multi-stakeholder waste management project, Indian NGOs as well as the formal and informal sector, conducted successful pilots projects in Bangalore, Delhi, Kolkata and Pune. The successes of these projects proved that progress in e-waste management could deliver inclusive economic benefits as well as improved health and environmental conditions. These projects increased political pressure as a result of media attention and growing public awareness which led ultimately to the adoption of the e-Waste (Management & Handling) Rules on the national level in 2011. These rules "are much more comprehensive than any US e-waste regulations and contain several similarities to the EU's current WEEE directive" (Skinner et al. 2010). In this context, the GIZ acted as a transfer organisation for the diffusion of European norms.

However, multi-level governance also diminishes effectiveness. According to the estimates of experts interviewed in March 2013, the lack of coordinated action results in ineffective redundancies, e.g. five bilateral projects are currently working on building standards parallel to each other. The impression that European actions appear to be fragmented result mainly from the confusion regarding diffuse EU and member states activities (Basile & Régnier, Groening 2012, Wuelbers 2011, Bava 2010).

Another interesting aspect in the climate relations between the EU and India relates to India's federal system. Despite the obvious dominance of the Union Government, the Indian states should also be considered significant climate policy players. The EU does not approach India's different climate governance structures yet, but focusses on the dialogue with central government (Murrell 2012). As EU experts argued in interviews given in March 2013, the EU aims to approach the Indian states as well.

In terms of the governance structures of the EU-India partnership, the ability of civil society organizations, the corporate sector and epistemic communities to promote the strategic partnership remains challenged. In comparison to the relations between the USA and India, an important link in the strategic partnership between the EU and India is missing – that is, the input from the diaspora. Aiming to improve economic relations and promote the dialogue about terrorism and nuclear proliferation issues,

the small but affluent Indian diaspora has exercised strong influence on the US Congress since the early 1990s. Comparable channels of influence, whether it be pressure- or lobbies groups or the diaspora, operate in the UK though are missing in the EU context (Wülbers, 2011, 149). "The EU-India Strategic Partnership was the work exclusively of the European Commission with the help of the European Delegation in India" (Wülbers 2011: 33). EU- Indian cooperation is much less driven by "bottom-up dynamics that characterize the U.S.-India link" (Muenchow-Pohl 2012, 13).

The EU Commission has provided financial means to develop such platforms in order to improve Indian-European networking. These involve the corporate sector, civil society, and academic exchange. Moreover, there are a number of parliamentary forums both on the state and the EU level. Supported by European academic organizations, the collaboration within the context of the EU-India Science and Technology Agreement has intensified (Groening 2012). Thus far, the mobilization of stakeholders from the private sector in order to produce innovations and new technologies through joint projects has been deemed insufficient on the EU level (Basile & Régnier 2012).

Conclusion

The potential for mutual beneficial climate relations between the EU and India is high in respect to economic and technological issues related to a transition to a low carbon economy. Common grounds are lower in respect to the controversial subject of international climate negotiations and multilateral approaches to international climate agreements. India and the EU have a number of political goals in common: both want to be recognized as global players in order to strengthen their international influence. Formed in 2005, their strategic partnership was aimed at developing an intensified cooperation and exchange and strengthening their ties in areas of mutual interests as well as the international context. The EU, in particular, strived to mainstream its leadership in supra- and international climate protection into the bilateral cooperation with the India. Indeed the partnership turned out to be more fertile in a few issue areas of mutual interest which co-benefit climate mitigation. Energy (security), research and technology cooperation and the development of environmental standards and respectively regulatory frameworks for their enforcement, are the issue areas where the partnership turned out to be more successful. The energy sector was identified as one of the pivotal areas for cooperation between India and the EU in 2012. Therein, cooperation can be built on significant potentials. The EU has rather ambitious goals and sophisticated instruments in place: the 20-20-20 climate package includes 20 % reduction goals for CO₂ emissions until 2020. In addition, the package calls for increases in energy efficiency improvements of 20 % and the increase in the use of renewable energy. The package also relates energy efficiency policies and the promotion of renewable energy to climate mitigation and greenhouse gas reduction in the member states. India's emerging economy faces a chronic energy crisis, with scarcity of resources and a high vulnerability to the repercussions of climate change. It therefore set up the National Climate Action plan in 2008. Within this plan, India puts emphasis on the

promotion of renewable energy (National Mission on Solar Energy) and energy efficiency (National Mission on Energy Efficiency) stressing the co-benefits of energy security, access to electricity as well as climate mitigation. India and the EU have set up policies for quite some time which aim at inducing market formation for climate-friendly technical innovations (Jaenicke 2012).

Despite progress in the bilateral collaboration on energy and environmental issues, the strategic partnership did not yet result in a better collaboration between India and the EU in global climate negotiations. Although the climate issue is for both partners an important and pressing one, their preferences diverge on a few very important issues. India's framing of the climate problem is driven by the regulative idea of the common but differentiated responsibility idea. The domestic discourse and the perception and preferences of the political elites involved in the design of India's climate negotiations constrain the commitment to binding obligations.

Europe's multi-level reinforcement patterns do not yet give impetus to the collaboration between the EU and India. In the area of climate change policy, the mechanisms that helped to overcome decisional stalemate in the EU, and indeed helped to formulate innovative and ambitious climate policies in the EU, do not noticeably nourish the strategic partnership between the EU and India.

The potentials for a multi-level reinforcement of climate policy in the partnership between the EU and India are not being addressed and exploited yet. From the European side the main focus is, first, still on the intergovernmental level. Secondly, supranational actors and member states develop their individual objectives for their bilateral cooperation with India rather than following a common European approach. Nevertheless the various forms of cooperation that include the centre and the states in India offer enough room for fruitful alliances which might move the Indian-European climate cooperation ahead further.

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