

## **Exploring Patterns of Participation in Transnational Climate Governance: The case of India**

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### **Introduction**

Research and the practice of negotiations and agenda setting in global environmental governance have shown that differences in opinions, interests and norms as well as access to resources between the global North and global South are still apparent and take a central position in shaping future sustainable governance in many issue areas of world politics (Frank Biermann, 2007). The concept of North-South divide has been questioned by some scholars to obscure intra-state variations as well as increasing fragmentation of the Global South illustrated by the tensions between emerging economies on one hand and less-developed and small island developing states on the other. However, although such variations do exist, the North-South divide is not only institutionalized in many conventions and agreements, but also developing countries or the Global South represent a common actor in global environmental negotiations and cannot be entirely neglected (Najam, 2005; Okereke, 2008; Williams, 2005).

Nevertheless, when it comes to future climate change negotiations, many concerns were raised in regard to effectiveness and legitimacy of the international climate regime that ultimately contributed to the gridlock surrounding the negotiation process between the developed and developing countries as well as in reaching its emission reduction targets. It is argued that a fundamental problem in climate change negotiations has been disagreement about the principles used to allocate responsibility between developed and developing countries, although equity concerns are institutionalized in many principles of the Kyoto Protocol, such as common but differentiated responsibility or through the concept of sustainable development or technology transfer (Najam, Huq, & Sokona, 2003). For example, developing countries overall seek a tight long-term emission reduction goal from developed countries, while they reject taking on binding commitments in the first post-2012 commitment period which is expected to last until 2020. Moreover, some other points that harden climate negotiations include developing countries' disagreement with what constitutes sufficient emission reductions by developed countries whereby it was stated that developed countries should reduce their emissions by at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels in 2020. Other disagreements lie in Brazil, China and India's opposition to proposals to reclassify developing countries with higher emissions and higher capacity into a separate group or into

what many characterize as BRICSAM countries comprising Brazil, India, China, South Africa, and Mexico (Von der Goltz, 2009). Moreover, while the aim of developed countries is to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a most cost-efficient way, developing countries uniformly stressed the primacy of development and poverty reduction and the need for new and additional funding for adaptation over mitigation action and ecological concerns (Najam, 2005).

Accordingly, the nature and ethical basis of international climate regime is largely put in question where such perceptions of inequality and contestation over justice have probably contributed to decisions by various countries to seek alternative means of dealing with climate change (HEYWARD, 2007; Okereke, 2010). Moreover, in such context a number of project and initiatives have arisen at many different levels of governance beyond the international regime. A particular focus in the scholarly debate was placed on the emergence of transnational climate governance arrangements that cut across borders and are understood as “the processes and institutions, formal and informal, whereby rules are created, compliance is elicited, and goods are provided in the pursuit of collective goals” when the actors involved are sub- and non-state actors from different countries (Hale & Held, 2011, pp. 12, 15). Therefore, considering the current deadlocks of intergovernmental climate negotiations processes and efforts to create the new institutional framework for the post-2012 treaty, a number of scholars aimed to examine the potential of transnational initiatives in addressing the governance deficit of the international climate system (Abbott, 2011; Backstrand, 2008; Bexell, Tallberg, & Uhlin, 2010; Okereke, Bulkeley, & Schroeder, 2009). As the future climate governance is likely to be organized around these transnational governance arrangements, their success or failure indeed depends on the reasonable participation and engagement of developing countries actors (Dingwerth, 2011).

On one hand, there is a substantial number of research examining impacts and the role of transnational climate governance arrangements on developing countries in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy, such as the impacts of private governance on actors in the South in the case of the Forest Stewardship Council (Pattberg, 2006), the effect of Voluntary Agreements (VA) on environmental performance in Columbia (Blackman, Uribe, Lyon, & Van den Hooff, 2012), the legitimacy of non-state global governance (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007), among many others. On the other hand, there is a substantial lack of research on the role of developing countries in such arrangements as both object and subjects of governance.

Yet, our understanding of Indian actor’s engagement in transnational climate governance remains limited both empirically and theoretically although India represents one of the crucial actors in future climate negotiations. Empirically this paper offers the first comprehensive stock taking analysis of Indian actors participation in transnational climate governance arrangements that moves beyond studies of individual cases that prevail much of the literature. Theoretically it aims to advance studies on how domestic politics shape the emergence and spread of transnational climate governance initiatives as well as on how the rearticulation of the state takes place in the context of fragmented authority and blurring of the state and non-state boundaries. I argue that such question could be addressed by examining various patterns of Indian actors’ participation by disaggregating practices and processes of governance. Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to disaggregate governance processes and practices of transnational climate initiatives that are active in India in order to extract various patterns of Indian

actors participation. Secondly, such patterns will be examined against theories on the rearticulation of the state, reconfiguration of authority and blurring of the state and non-state divide.

The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, I begin by introducing the emergence of transnational climate governance arrangements and the current debates on their potential in closing the global governance participatory gap when it comes to the engagement of Southern actors and India. Secondly, I present the problem setting of the research by highlighting the need to understand the blurring of state and non-state boundaries and reconfiguration of power that have appeared with the emergence of transnational climate governance arrangements and within which participation needs to be examined. Thirdly, based on the governmentality analytical perspective, I present an analytical framework for disaggregating governance processes in order to extract various patterns of participation. Then, I present the mapping of various patterns of Indian actors participation in transnational climate initiatives. Finally, findings are linked to the theory that might explain such patterns of participation.

## **Proliferation of Transnational Climate Governance arrangements**

Today, we observe a trend towards policy domains that are marked by a patchwork of international and transnational institutions that are different in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public, non-profit, for-profit), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), their subject matter (from specific policy fields to universal concerns) as well as actor-networks and their underlying discursive formations (F. Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009). Such developments led to fundamental transformations of world politics where fragmentation becomes a necessary structural characteristic and quality of global governance architectures in and beyond the environmental domain (Zelli and van Asselt, 2012).

Global climate governance is perhaps the most well-researched case of all issue areas when it comes to fragmentation. It is characterized by a patchwork of international as well as transnational governance arrangements that are not always connected to the interstate climate convention and the Kyoto Protocol. These transnational governance arrangements include a variety of different types of initiatives such as club-like forums; regulated (e.g. EU ETS) and voluntary markets (e.g. Voluntary Carbon Standard and the Gold Standard); initiatives that keep corporations accountable for their carbon footprints either through self-regulations (e.g. Carbon Disclosure Project) or through scrutiny by CSOs; public-private governance networks that implement internationally agreed outcomes (e.g. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership), public non-state networks such as C40 global cities partnerships. In addition, the proliferation of transnational standard setting institutions comprising of companies and non-governmental organizations that are voluntary in nature emerged as important actors in global climate change governance (Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). Moreover, they emerged with varying normative frameworks that may contest those set by the states and international system (e.g. those that are addressing the climate issues through consumption-based accounting to those that use market mechanisms to pursue environmental goals or mainstream climate change issues into sustainable development). Finally, global climate governance is marked with multiplicity of actors such as private for profit, private for non-profit or public-private initiatives and their actor-constellations, as well as with

different discursive formations of climate change issue (e.g. an environmental degradation problem, a development issue, a security issue, etc.) (Harris & Symons, 2013; Vlassopoulos, 2012; F. Biermann, Pattberg, & Zelli, 2010).

Accordingly, considering the current deadlocks of intergovernmental climate negotiations processes and efforts to create the new institutional framework for the post-2012 treaty, a number of scholars aimed to examine the potential of transnational initiatives in addressing the governance deficit of the international climate system (Abbott, 2011; Backstrand, 2008; Bexell et al., 2010; Okereke et al., 2009). As the future climate governance is likely to be organized around these transnational governance arrangements, their success or failure indeed depends on the reasonable participation and engagement of developing countries actors (Dingwerth, 2011). Therefore, special attention has been given to their potential in democratizing global climate governance and closing “the participatory governance gap” of international governance system by offering new negotiation venues that may facilitate engagement of the larger number of actors beyond the state and especially the actors from developing countries (Benner, Reinicke, & Witte, 2004; Haas, 2004; Nanz & Steffek, 2004). However, this debate remains highly contested. Others warn that such initiatives may lead to further weakening of the representation of Southern interests and the privatization of environmental governance where the decision making would rest within those actors with considerable power employed in pursuance of self-interest that are primarily based in the industrialized countries (Cashore, 2002; Nanz & Steffek, 2004; Pattberg, 2010).

### **State and transnational climate governance**

However, although the proliferation and rise of transnational governance arrangements and new modes of governing are unquestionable, the role of the state as both subjects and objects of governance and their participation and engagement in transnational climate governance arrangements remains debated and insufficiently understood by empirical research. Accordingly, this paper takes the approach that thinking about the future of global climate governance needs to start with the political dynamics among different processes and practices of governance that merge transnational governance systems and the interstate negotiations. Thinking exclusively in terms of the emergence of private governance “beyond the state” and “the crisis of multilateralism” on one hand, and emphasis on “retrenched sovereignty” on another, may mask transforming world politics. Many have argued that the increase use of partnerships between the state and non-state actors in transnational governance as well as the emergence of non-state actors in world politics should not be interpreted as a “zero-sum” game whereby power is shifted from state to non-state actors indicating a replacement and decline of sovereign authority (Backstrand, 2008; Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012; Sending & Neumann, 2006). Rather, work on global governance is increasingly blurring state and non-state divides by drawing attention to networked, hybrid or shared authority (Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012). However, despite such recognitions there is a limited engagement in understanding how the processes of governing is accomplished in such reconfigured world politics. Relying on dichotomy between the public and private/state and non-state authority that pervades much of the literature obscures the continuous shaping and reshaping of these boundaries in the process of governing (Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012).

For example, it has been shown that many of the climate transnational governance arrangements, such as the climate public-private partnership World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), operate in

the “shadow of hierarchy” as states and international organizations attempt to delegate some of their primary functions to non-state actors (Pattberg, 2010). Others such as in the case of “global carbon markets”, became highly institutionalized in world politics where the normative frameworks, rules and subsequent implementation are the outcomes of the agency beyond the state (Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). Moreover, in the case of standard setting voluntary non-binding initiatives such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), it has been shown that they exert a significant impact on Southern actors as they shape new normative frameworks and induce discursive shifts in the issue area of sustainability politics where the participation of Southern actors may be direct but also indirect (Dingwerth, 2011). Finally, the recent rise of a transnational timber legality regime operating through forest legality verifications reconfigures the boundaries between the public and private as they draw upon sustainable forest certifications, but at the same time emphasize adherence to national laws and regulations (Cashore & Stone, 2012). Therefore, legality certification challenge private public distinction and the dominance of neo-liberal discourse of governance operating through markets or marketization of governance. Finally, the role of cities as emerging actors in global climate governance not only challenged research and policy communities to reconsider at which scale the problem of climate change is to be addressed, but also the very reconfiguration of the state that takes place through the way in which they mobilize private actors alongside the (local) state (Bulkeley 2010). Accordingly, the dichotomy between the public and the private arrangements, state and non-state actors proved not to be helpful in understanding how the authority has been articulated and shaped through complex interactions among international and transnational governance arrangements, normative frameworks and discourses (Backstrand, 2008; Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). Instead, the rise of transnational climate governance initiatives does not signify the crisis of multilateralism, but indicates its transformation, the blurring of public and private governance as well as “re-articulation” of the state and their practices (Bernstein, Betsill, Hoffmann, & Paterson, 2010).

### **The case of India**

India offers an interesting case in which to analyze the processes and practices of transnational climate governance and the ways these governance processes bring various patterns of participation possible. India is a large developing country with nearly 700 million rural population directly depending on agriculture, forests and fisheries for their livelihoods, where about 68% are directly or indirectly involved in the agricultural sector (O’Brien et al., 2004). India is becoming one of the major economic and political drivers in world politics thus transforming and shifting power relations from unipolar to a multipolar power constellation (Gu, Humphrey, & Messner, 2008, Humphrey & Messner, 2006). Considering its economic performance, leadership role in developing countries and its emission profile, India is becoming one of the leader actors in global climate environmental governance as well (Vihma, 2011). Moreover, power shift from international to micro levels is also important to consider in the context of India as the role of the megacities like New Delhi and private sector is increasing (M. M. Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a). Moreover, India takes an interesting dual position in climate negotiation processes, namely a poor and developing economy with low levels of historical and per capita emissions, as well as a large and rapidly growing economy with rising emissions (Dubash, 2013). Moreover, although India has more in common with least developed countries than with the emerging rapidly industrialized countries

in terms of per capita indicators of economic progress, it has been affiliated with more with the later rather than the former when it comes to its own negotiation strategies and external perceptions (ibid.)

### **The aim of research and research question**

Partly resulting from the contested theoretical and conceptual accounts on the implications of transnational governance arrangements in closing the participatory gap of climate governance as well as the role of Southern actors in the world politics as both the objects and subjects of governance, currently there's a substantial lack of research on systematic analysis of various domestic conditions that favor or impede the engagement of Southern actors in transnational governance arrangements and to what extent they exert a significant influence within these emerging transnational initiatives.

Accordingly, examining various patterns of state participation in transnational climate governance arrangements provides opportunities within which one can examine new mechanisms of state engagement in transnational governance. In the context of the reconfigured authority and blurring of state and non-state boundaries, governments continue to shape international politics but not through traditional means of state-to-state diplomacy but rather toward a wider range of activities and mechanisms that take into account a wider range of different set of actors that are engaged in global governance. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to disaggregate governance processes and practices of transnational climate initiatives that are active in India in order to extract various patterns of Indian actors participation by looking at various mechanisms and processes through which rearticulation of the state takes place. Secondly, such patterns will be discussed against theories on the rearticulation of the state, reconfiguration of power and blurring of the state and non-state divide.

### **Analytical perspectives**

The perspective of governmentality offers a good lens within which it is possible to examine the objectives of the paper. Firstly, this analytical perspective aims at investigating the specific practices and techniques of governing as an empirical phenomena instead of focusing on institutional positions per se. Accordingly, when it comes to examining how participation is achieved in the context of reconfiguration of authority and blurring of the state and non-state boundaries, it can aid at disaggregating various patterns of participation by looking at various practices and procedures through which it is performed and in which forms and modes of governance. Secondly, by employing the concept of rationality that characterizes the systematic thinking, reflection and knowledge that is integral to and renders possible different modes of governing (Sending & Neumann, 2006), it also offers the possibility to examine why participation didn't occur as this analytical perspective focuses on how certain orientations and actions are rendered thinkable while others are excluded and why different actors, interests, ideas and materials are included and excluded in order to shape climate change as a governable problem.

Accordingly, I take governmentality approach which assumes that instead of a priori identifiable and fixed categorization of what makes up state and non-state boundary, it suggests that authority is

constituted in and through the process of governing as “different actors, interests, ideas and materials are variously included and excluded in order to shape climate change as a governable problem” (Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012, p. 744). For Foucault, the state is ‘not an object that is always already there’ but rather the product of historically distinct forms of governing, produced through the relation between sovereignty, discipline and government (Foucault, 2009). As Sending and Neumann (2006, p. 658) argue ‘the ascendance of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out global governance functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors, or a matter of the changing sources of, or institutional locus for authority. Rather it is an expression of a change in governmentality’ in which ostensibly non-state actors become integral to the project of governing global environmental change. Accordingly, rather than seeing the state or authority as a fixed, a priori identifiable entity, governing is achieved by and through individuals and institutions across the public/private divide whereas authority does not recede strictly within particular actors and institutions but is created through and in governing. Governmentality perspective on power does not necessarily denote the decline of state or transfer of power, but instead emphasizes the transformation of power whereby the state continues to exercise control “at a distance” (Blakeley, 2010).

Therefore, governmentality perspectives suggest that in seeking to examine the process of global environmental governance, analysts need to attend to the provisional nature of state/non-state subjectivities and the ways in which these are constituted through the process of governing. Importantly, rather than seeing the state as a coherent entity, ‘viewing the state as an assemblage of practices and rationales means that any unity the state might achieve tends to be no more than provisional ... [so that] the liberal state is likely to be multi-centered and tied into diverse sets of relations with “external” actors’ (Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012). It is not only to consider how, by and for whom governing is accomplished, but also how institutions and actors are established through these processes. Accordingly in the context of dispersed nature of rule where what constitutes the state/non-state is dynamic, contingent and provisional, it is important to consider how participation is achieved socially and materially by and through individuals and institutions across the public and private divide (Harriet Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012).

## Methodology

Instead of assessing participation from a normative perspective based on predefined set of criteria, the aim of this paper is to show how participation is being performed in the context of reconfiguration of authority and public and private divide. By disaggregating the processes and practices across a whole spectrum of transnational climate governance arrangements it is possible to extract patterns of participation not only where it is present but also where it isn't. While most of the studies focus on “success” stories, that is where participation exists instead of hypothesizing about the instances in which we can or cannot observe its presence, the paper employs a large-n analysis in order to contextualize instances of both participation occurrence and absence. Such focus would help to overcome selection bias of cases where participation occurs and help examine patterns of participation across a number of cases. Therefore, I use large n assessment which allows for the examination of patterns and extraction of factors that would emerge from the comparative analysis of India actors' participation across a whole spectrum of transnational institutions. [In the next step of the research, large n study would be



supplemented with a focus on a particular case study analysis of India actor' participation in a particular transnational institution that emerges as an interesting case from the large n study. Such case study analysis would help illuminate the micro-dynamics of specific processes of Indian actors' participation and casual mechanisms as well as informal venues of access. Moreover, I used both quantitative and qualitative approaches to analysis. The quantitative analysis covers long term dynamics in a wider institutional setting and help to understand the broader trends in the institutionalization of Indian actors' participation and its formal institutional design (Steffek, 2010). On the other hand qualitative analysis helped to interpret various process of governance and how participation is achieved in such.]

I used the database developed by Hale and Roger (2014) which although contains possible biases and limitations so far represents the most exhaustive list of 75 transnational climate governance cases<sup>1</sup>. To assess Indian actors participation in the set of TCG initiatives, I modified the dataset to identify those initiatives that are active in India together with the date of their initiation. Criteria for determining whether an initiative is active in India includes those cases where at least one Indian public or private actor (e.g. an Indian firm, NGO, or municipality) becomes a member of or participant in a particular arrangement, partners with other actors to create one, or begins to use a standard as displayed on the website of a particular initiative (Hale and Roger 2012). Moreover, in order to examine how robust Indian participation is I looked at those initiatives that are active in India with two or more Indian participants. By doing so, I identified a set of 30 initiatives that are active in India and which are listed in Appendix 1.

A weakness of the international relations literature is that it provides a little guidance as to how to evaluate the processes of participation in the context of the reconfiguration of authority and blurring of the state and non-state divide. Accordingly, following McGuirk, Bulkeley and Dowling (2014) in their efforts to disseminate different programs that orchestrate urban carbon governance, I adopt typology approach in order to extract patterns of participation through the iterative process of theoretical perspectives employed and empirical findings. In order to extract patterns of participation I used different categories including what type these initiatives are and functions they undertake based on typology developed by Abbott (2011). Moreover, I examined who initiated initiatives and how many were initiated by Indian actors by looking at where at least one Indian actor was indicated as being a founding member or a signatory. Then, I looked at target participants whose behavior such initiatives aim to steer based on categories developed by Hale and Roger (2012), as well as what issues these initiatives seek to address. This categorization is not completely comprehensive, but rather it serves as a guide for the iteration of the theoretical and conceptual perspectives employed with the empirical findings out of which new categories will be integrated in the second draft of the paper. As indicated, many of these categories are likely to involve cross-cutting entities and actors, mechanisms and forms, however it is possible to extract different ways in which these categories are related to one another

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<sup>1</sup> Their database builds upon two others, namely first one developed by Bulkeley and the colleagues (2012) and the second created by Hoffmann, which was subsequently updated based on their own set of criteria for inclusion and exclusion. For more information on the description of database development, see supplementary material to the article (Hale & Roger, 2014).



forming different patterns of participation. For more information on each of the categories see Appendix 2.

Empirically I analyzed the patterns of India actors' participation in 30 transnational climate arrangements based on a review of primary documents such as official documents of transnational climate arrangements, the public summaries of audit reports and secondary sources, mission statements, the content of initiative websites (membership lists, participant registries, etc.), online statements and media reports, de jure statements, etc.

### **India and transnational climate governance arrangements: Mapping Indian actors engagement in TCG**

Out of the total number of 75 transnational climate initiatives in the dataset, nearly half (40%) with a total number of 30 are to some extent active in India. Out of 30 transnational climate initiatives only five were initiated by Indian actors including Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, C40 cities, Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum and Global Methane Initiative. The Indian central and local governments take the central position as initiating actors in all cases except for Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network which was initiated by CSOs and firms. The analysis revealed three patterns on the role of India as an initiating actor. Firstly, India was an initiating actor of those initiatives that used soft law and voluntary national GHG emission reduction targets for developing countries. This finding reflects Indian strong opposition to taking on binding commitments in the first post-2012 commitment period which is expected to last until 2020. For example, the APP was formed as a soft law climate change arrangement outside the UN climate process that establishes voluntary national GHG emission reduction targets. Although it seized to exist in 2011, it is argued that the APP was established in order to contest further Kyoto-style emission reduction targets for developed countries in the post-2012 climate negotiations by the USA, Australia, Canada and Japan. On the other hand, other APP countries including India and China have been more ambivalent in support of soft law under APP while still advocating strongly for binding developed nation targets within the UN climate negotiations based on historical responsibility (McGee & Taplin, 2009). Besides, India was an initiating actor of these initiatives that are particularly engaged in coal mining sector-based public-private partnerships such as Global Methane Initiative, Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum as well as the APP. The aim of all three initiatives is to increase information sharing between partner countries on technology innovation and development for addressing energy efficiency and reducing GHG emissions from the coal-based power plants such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology based on the national interests and expertise. This finding comes to no surprise considering Indian position as one of the global emitters of methane where coal contributed about 62% of India's total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, as well as its efforts to secure coal based energy generation as more 70% of India's electricity generation is based on coal (Chikkatur and Sagar 2009, Shahi, 2007). Finally, India was an initiating actor of two municipal climate networks including C40 Cities and Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network. A number of research emphasized the growing involvement of municipal governments and other urban actors in efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and increasingly to adopt adaptation measures (M. M. Betsill & Bulkeley,

2006; Michele M. Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012). It is argued that such governance schemes not only challenged research and policy communities to reconsider at which scale the problem of climate change is to be addressed, but also the very reconfiguration of the state through the way in which they mobilize private actors alongside the (local) state (Bulkeley 2010).

Based on the functions which transnational climate governance initiatives undertake, it is found that operational (O) and information and networking (IN) initiatives are equally dispersed in the database accounting for 33% each. A large proportion of initiatives employ standards and commitments (SC) function with 28%, and finally only a small number of 7% is engaged in financing (F). Standard and commitments type of schemes that are active in India and include genuinely private participants are Global Reporting Initiative, Greenhouse Gas Protocol, ISO 14064/14065, Plan Vivo, The Climate Group (Member Principles), The Gold Standard, The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB Standard), UN Global Compact Caring for Climate and Verified Carbon Standard. Based on the type of initiatives, the largest proportion encompasses the collaborative type with 50%, followed by the private-led with 33% and the state-led with 17%. Considering that collaborative can include at least two different type of actors, while private-led can be comprised of both firms and CSOs, it is found that government actors dominate transnational climate initiatives active in India, followed by firms and finally CSOs. Out of 30 initiative state actors are absent in 9 initiatives including Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN), Climate Savers Computing Initiative, Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard), Global Sustainability Electricity Partnership (formerly the E8), Green Power Market Development Group, Greenhouse Gas Protocol, Plan Vivo, The Gold Standard, Verified Carbon Standard (formerly the Voluntary Carbon Standard). Most of these initiatives are involved in creating voluntary or binding standards for calculating and reporting GHG emissions for entire firms and are assumed to present an instance of private regulation meaning that private actors project authority without delegation of states (Green 2010). However, when it comes to emission trading, it is found that Indian actors are engaged in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol to a much greater extent hosting around 26.5% of the CDM project market share worldwide. Some argue that India presents a case of market-dominated carbon governance taking place under a weak shadow of hierarchy and with little civil society involvement (Beneke 2009). As India holds a share of 28.1% of the total 2,747 CDM projects in the renewable energy sector, it comes to no surprise that the role of CDM is highly dependent on the broader institutional environment and political economy of energy policy and the relations of power that characterize the domestic energy sector (Phillips and Newell 2013).

Targeted actors are governments 27%, businesses 37%, local governments 15%, communities 12%, carbon market participants 7%. The type of initiatives whose targeted actors are communities are either collaborative or private-led (CSOs). Both of collaborative initiatives, including Community Development Carbon Fund and BioCarbon Fund, are funding programmes housed within Carbon Finance Unit of the World Bank. While both private-led are engaged in addressing issues of poverty reduction and carbon sequestration through certification and labeling and standard setting. They are Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard) and Plan Vivo. Moreover, when it comes to private actors engagement in carbon markets, it is observed that they are to a limited extent

involved in shaping carbon market governance by for example interpreting sustainability criteria and additionality tests in their favor by engaging in private standard setting initiatives such as Greenhouse Gas Protocol. However, their engagement in CDM is much greater. Finally, NGOs were involved more as partners to governments than watchdogs. While the initiatives included in the database are focused on mitigation, there is significant variation in the sorts of issues they are seeking to address, with GHG emission reduction being addressed the most, followed by energy, technology, infrastructure, etc. There is no particular variation across the issues with which initiatives are concerned with the type of initiative. In all different types of initiatives besides GHG emission reduction energy, technology innovation and economy play a big role. Public initiatives play a proportionally greater role in the domains of energy, infrastructure and economy, while private in energy and infrastructure. The role of national governments in those initiatives with a focus on clean energy is particularly distinct. Energy is the second most targeted issue beside GHG gas emission reduction and enjoys considerable political support. Many measures taken to address climate change promote end-use energy efficiency, and pursue of renewable energy supply, which is consistent with Indian position in climate negotiations of creating sustainable development benefits alongside emission reduction.

## Conclusion

Research and the practice of negotiations and agenda setting in global environmental governance have shown that differences in opinions, interests and norms as well as access to resources between the global North and global South are still apparent and take a central position in shaping future sustainable governance in many issue areas of world politics. Considering the current deadlocks of intergovernmental climate negotiations processes and efforts to create the new institutional framework for the post-2012 treaty, a number of scholars aimed to examine the potential of transnational climate governance initiatives in addressing the participatory deficit of the international climate system and especially when it comes to the engagement of the actors from the Global South (Abbott, 2011; Backstrand, 2008; Bexell et al., 2010; Okereke et al., 2009). However, this debate remains highly contested. As the future climate governance is likely to be organized around these transnational governance arrangements, their success or failure indeed depends on the reasonable participation and engagement of developing countries actors (Dingwerth, 2011).

Partly resulting from the contested theoretical and conceptual accounts on the implications of transnational governance arrangements in closing the participatory gap of climate governance as well as the role of Southern actors in the world politics as both the objects and subjects of governance, currently there's a substantial lack of research on systematic analysis of various domestic conditions that favor or impede the engagement of Southern actors in transnational governance arrangements and to what extent they exert a significant influence within these emerging transnational initiatives. Although India takes one of the crucial roles in future climate negotiations, our understanding of Indian actor's engagement in transnational climate governance remains limited both empirically and theoretically. Empirically this paper offers the first comprehensive stock taking analysis of Indian actors participation in transnational climate governance arrangements. Theoretically it aims to advance studies on how domestic politics shape the emergence and spread of transnational climate governance initiatives as

well as on how the rearticulation of the state takes place in the context of fragmented authority and blurring of the state and non-state boundaries. I argue that such question could be addressed by examining various patterns of state's participation by disaggregating practices and processes of governance through which new mechanisms of state engagement in transnational governance can be examined. Accordingly, this paper takes the approach that thinking about the future of global climate governance needs to start with the political dynamics among different processes and practices of governance that merge transnational governance systems and the interstate negotiations instead of considering these processes as a "zero sum" game.

Preliminary findings cast doubt on the potential of transnational climate governance arrangements in closing participatory gap when it comes to engagement of different set of Indian actors as many of these arrangements operate under shadow of state hierarchy. However, in order to fulfill the objectives of the paper, the typology used to disaggregate governance processes and practices needs to be revised. For example, instead of using Abbott's typology of different functions that an arrangement might undertake, I find Bulkeley and Kern's categorization of enabling, provisional, market and regulatory mechanisms more useful (2006). Moreover, some other indicators like norms or discourses might also be useful to integrate in the framework. Further work is still much needed and especially when it comes to establishing categories by which process of state rearticulation could be captured.

#	Name	Year Started (and Ended)	Date active in India	Type (Abbott 2011)	Function (Abbott 2011)	Initiating actors	Targeted actors (Hale and Roger 2012)	Issues addressed/sectors
1	Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate	2006-2011	2006	Collaborative (state and firms)	O (technology R&D; best practices; pilot projects; demonstration and deployment; skills enhancement; and best practices)	Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, US	Governments, businesses	GHG emission reduction, energy, infrastructure
2	Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN)	2008	2008	Private (CSOs and firm)	IN/O (demonstration and deployment; lesson learned; development and implementation, information sharing)	Indian cities among others	Local governments	Infrastructure, adaptation
3	BioCarbon Fund	2004	2009	Collaborative (state and firm)	F (project financing)	World bank	Communities	GHG emission reduction, poverty, carbon
4	C40 cities	2005	2005	State-led (state)	IN (knowledge generation, information sharing, networking)	18 megacities including Delhi	Local governments	GHG emission reduction, energy, infrastructure, adaptation
5	Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)	2001	2006	Private-led (CSOs and firms)	O/IN (information sharing, demonstration and deployment, registries)	Global North	Businesses, local governments	GHG reduction, infrastructure, carbon
6	Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum	2003	2003	State-led (state)	O/IN (technology R&D, demonstration and deployment, skills enhancement)	India among other states	Governments	Technology
7	Clean Air Initiative	2001	2001	Collaborative (state and CSOs)	IN/O (knowledge generation, skills enhancement, demonstration and deployment, lobbying)	Asian development bank, World Bank, USAid	Local governments, governments	GHG emission reduction, infrastructure, energy
8	Climate Champions	2008	2008	Collaborative (state and CSOs)	IN (information sharing, skills enhancement)	UK British Council	Communities	GHG emission reduction
9	Climate Savers Computing Initiative	2007	2009	Private (CSOs and firms)	SC/O (technology R&D, demonstration and deployment, best practices, lobbying)	CSC, Dell, Google, HP, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft and the World Wildlife Fund	Businesses	GHG emission reduction, energy
10	Climate Technology Initiative PFAN	2006	2006	Collaborative (state and firms)	O/I (technology R&D, demonstration and deployment, knowledge generation, best	The Climate Technology	Businesses	Energy

					practices)	Initiative and the UNFCCC		
						Expert group on technology transfer		
11	Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standard)	2005	2007	Private (CSOs)	SC (RSS standards, certification and labeling)	CARE, Conservation International, the Nature Conservancy, Rainforest Alliance, WCS	Communities	GHG emission reduction, poverty, carbon
12	Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	1999	2011	Collaborative (state, CSOs and firms)	SC/O (certification and labeling, RSS schemes, demonstration and deployment)	North	Governments	GHG emission reduction, energy
13	Community Development Carbon Fund	2003	2006	Collaborative (state and firms)	F (project financing)	WB, IETA, UNFCCC	Communities	GHG emission reduction, poverty, carbon
14	Global Sustainability Electricity Partnership (formerly the E8)	1992	1998	Private (firms)	IN/O (information sharing, skills enhancement, technology R&D, knowledge generation)	The North	Business and governments	Energy, infrastructure
15	Global Methane Initiative (formerly the Methane to Markets Partnership)	2004	2004	State-led (state)	O (skills enhancement, demonstration and deployment)	India among other countries, EC, ADB, IADB	Governments and businesses	GHG emission reduction, energy, economy
16	Global Reporting Initiative	1997	2010	Collaborative (CSOs and state)	SC/IN (knowledge generation, RSS standards, information sharing)	The North	Businesses	GHG emission reduction
17	Green Power Market Development Group	2001	2013	Private (CSOs and firms)	IN (information sharing)	EU	Businesses and governments	Energy
18	Greenhouse Gas Protocol	1998	2012	Private (CSOs and firms)	SC/O (RSS standards, demonstration and deployment, capacity building)	The North	Governments, businesses	GHG emission reduction
19	HSBC Climate Partnership	2007	2008	Collaborative (private, CSOs and states)	O (demonstration and deployment, best practices, information sharing, pilot projects)	The North	Business and governments	Energy, technology, economy
20	ICLEI - Local Governments for	1993	2006	State-led (state)	IN/SC (lobbying, networking, information	The North	Local governments	Carbon, infrastructure,

Sustainability				sharing, voluntary commitments schemes)			economy	
21	ISO 14064/14065	2006	2007	Collaborative (state and firms)	SC/O (RSS standards, best practices, demonstration and deployment)	The North	Carbon market participants	GHG emission reduction
22	Plan Vivo	2008	2013	Private (CSOs)	SC/O (certification and labeling, voluntary commitments schemes, demonstration and deployment)	The North	Communities	GHG reduction, poverty, carbon
23	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)	2002	2008	Collaborative (state, CSOs and firms)	IN/O (information sharing, networking, demonstration and deployment, lobbying)	UK and partners at WSSD	Businesses	Energy, economy
24	The Climate Group (Member Principles)	2004	2008	Collaborative (state and firms)	SC/IN (information sharing, network building, knowledge generation, voluntary commitments schemes)	The North	Businesses and governments	GHG emission reduction, energy, economy, technology
25	The Gold Standard	2001	2009	Private (CSOs)	SC/IN (RSS standards, certification and labeling, information sharing)	The North with China	Carbon market participants	Energy, carbon, infrastructure
26	The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB Standard)	2007	2009	Collaborative (state, firms and CSOS)	SC (certification and labeling)	The North	Governments, businesses	GHG emission reduction, energy
27	UN Global Compact Caring for Climate	2009	2009	Collaborative (state and firms)	SC (voluntary commitments schemes)	UN	Businesses, governments	GHG emission reduction, energy, technology
28	UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI)	2000	2013	Collaborative (state and CSOs)	IN/F (knowledge generation, demonstration and deployment, project financing)	UNEP	Businesses	GHG emission reduction
29	Verified Carbon Standard (formerly the Voluntary Carbon Standard)	2007	2007	Private (firms)	SC (RSS standards, certification and labeling)	The North	Carbon market participants	GHG emission reduction
30	World Mayors' Council on Climate Change	2005	2008	State-led (state)	IN (lobbying, networking, knowledge sharing)	Japan	Local governments	Economy



## Appendix 2.

Type of initiative (Abbott 2011):

- 1) State-led: Public institutions are dominant. In transnational governance the actors in this category are sub-state institutions, such as city and provincial governments and associations thereof.
- 2) Private-led: firms (such as individual business firms, groups of firms and industry associations) and CSOs (such as individual CSOs as well as CSO coalitions and networks) are dominant
- 3) Collaborative: governmental bodies share governance with firms and/or CSOs in public-private partnerships

Function (Abbott 2011):

- 1) Standards and Commitments –(mandatory rules, Regulatory Standard Setting (RSS) standards, voluntary commitments schemes, certification and labeling)
- 2) Operational (technology R&D, pilot projects, demonstration and deployment, registries, skills enhancement, development and implementation, best practices)
- 3) Information and Networking- (information sharing, networking, knowledge generation, lobbying)
- 4) Financing- (project financing)

Target participants (Hale and Roger 2012):

- 1) local governments (e.g. townships, municipalities, provinces, states, etc.) ,
- 2) governments (e.g. sub-national governmental units, the central government and its administrative apparatus such as ministries, agencies, etc.),
- 3) businesses (e.g. small, medium and large size firms, as well as various non-profit organizations),
- 4) carbon market participants (mainly businesses of varying size, but I separated them out from other business participants since they play a unique role in TCG), and
- 5) communities.

Issues addressed/sectors:

- 1) GHG emission reduction;
- 2) Adaptation;
- 3) Energy;
- 4) Carbon;
- 5) Economy;
- 6) Infrastructure;
- 7) Technology;
- 8) Poverty.

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